Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As computer systems communicate more and more with others that they know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up resources and disable servers. This paper shows how some principles that have already been used to make cryptographic protocols more resistant to denial of service by trading o the cost to defender against the cost to the attacker can be formalized based on a modi cation of the Gong-Syverson fail-stop model of cryptographic protocols, and indicates the ways in which existing cryptographic protocol analysis tools could be modi ed to operate within this formal framework. We also indicate how this framework could be extended to protocols that do not make use of strong authentication.
Introduction
Denial of service is becoming a growing concern. As computer systems communicate more and more with others that they know less and less, they become increasingly vulnerable to hostile intruders who may take advantage of the very protocols intended for the establishment and authentication of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, it is not possible to rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy for protection (as is recommended in the classic work of Gligor and Millen in 7, 18, 19] ). Instead the defenses, as much as possible, must be built into the protocols themselves.
One of the most common and devastating types of denial of service attack is the resource exhaustion attack, in which an attacker, by initiating a large number of instances of a protocol, causes a victim to waste resources. Although the victim can thwart this attack by refusing the communicate with the attacker once the source of its message is known, this defense can be circumvented, or at least made more di cult, by disguising the origin of the requests. For example, the SYN attack on TCP/IP is a classic example of this type of attack. The SYN attack works by having an attacker initiate a number of instances of the protocol but fail to complete them. The victim exhausts its resources maintaining state information until timeout. Since the veri cation of the origin of messages in TCP/IP is based on sequence numbers that are easily forged, the victim cannot easily identify the attacker even when it is aware it is under attack.
There are a number of defenses against attacks like this. One is to reduce the cost to the potential victim (from now on called the defender) of engaging in the protocol. Another is to increase the resources of the defender. A third is to introduce some sort of authentication so that a defender could at least tell where an attack is coming from.
However, using authentication introduces denial of service risks of its own. Suppose, for example, that a protocol requires the defender to verify messages signed with digital signatures. Veri cation of such signatures is relatively resource-consuming, and an attacker could introduce denial of service by launching a large number of messages with bogus digital signatures, which the defender would then waste its resources verifying. Since the signatures were bogus, there would o er no assistance to the defender in verifying the origin of the attack.
This problem has not been ignored by protocol designers, and there have been a number of proposals to reduce the denial-of-service risks involved in participating in a protocol that uses authentication, in particular strong authentication. These usually involve using weak authentication when the protocol is initiated, but stronger authentication as it completes. This, for example, is the approach followed by Kent et al. in 11] , which applies these principals in a systematic way to design security enhancements for several internet routing protocols. The idea is that, even when it is within an attacker's capacities to break the weak authentication, it will still cost it a certain amount of e ort 3 which may make it infeasible, or at least more di cult, for it to practice the multiple spoo ng required to mount an e ective denial of service attack. Thus the protocol provides protection against an attacker spending minimal resources in its initial stages without leaving itself vulnerable to denial of service attacks that take advantage of strong authentication, while still ultimately protecting the protocol against spoo ng by an attacker willing to spend greater resources. This does not leave the protocol completely invulnerable against a denial of service attack by a strong opponent, but it increases the cost to an attacker. For example, Photuris' use of cookies 10] , in which a light-weight authenticator is attached to the beginning of each message and must be veri ed before any further message processing is done, is a classic example of this kind of approach. Cookies have since become a popular defense against denial of service in a number of protocols, including the version of TCP/IP used in Linux 2] , where they are used to defend against the SYN attack that we described earlier.
Techniques like these assume an implicit model of the interaction between the attacker and defender. The attacker's goals are two fold: rst to cause the defender to waste its resources by interacting with the attacker, and secondarily to keep the defender from learning its identity, since if it could, it could protect itself against further attacks by refusing to to engage with further communication with the defender. The defender is assumed to have bounded resources that could possibly be exhausted by a clever attacker. The attacker may or may not have bounded resources, and may or may not have resources greater than the defender, but there is assumed to be some level of resource expenditure beyond which the attack is considered to be di cult enough so that at least the likelihood of widespread attack is reduced.
Formal methods are one good way of addressing problems involving a lot of complex information that must be carefully evaluated. And indeed, formal methods have already been applied with great success in evaluating whether or not cryptographic protocols satisfy their authentication and secrecy requirements. Moreover, the underlying process, showing that certain authentication goals are achieved in the face of attack by an intruder expending a certain amount of e ort, is similar to that used to show that a protocol satis es its authentication requirements. Thus it should be possible to apply many of the tools and techniques that have been developed for the veri cation of authentication properties to the analysis of denial of service. In this paper we provide a framework for evaluating a protocol for resistance to denial of service attacks involving resource exhaustion in a way that is intended to allow us to make maximal use of these tools. Although it is most applicable to cryptographic protocols, which use the most expensive form of authentication, it can be applied to any protocol that uses authentication, weak or strong, to protect against denial of service.
This framework extends our earlier model described in 16] by expanding the model of an intruder's capabilities is to include the cost of an action to the intruder as well as a list of actions of which we assume it to be capable. This allows us to model, not only the tradeo between the cost to the defender 4 and the abilities of an attacker to implement di erent subsets of the Dolev-Yao model, as was done in the earlier paper, but also to compare the cost to the attacker directly with the cost of the defender, whenever this is possible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we motivate and present the framework and apply it to an example. In Section 3 we discuss the ways in which existing security protocol analysis tools and methods could be modi ed to verify protocols within this framework. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Framework
Motivation
In this section we describe the basic reasoning that underlies our framework, and the motivation for making the choices that we did.
Our construction of the framework begins with the observation that any point at which during a protocol execution at which a responder may accept a bogus message as genuine could be used to launch a denial of service attack. However, it is not enough for the attacker simply to have the ability to pass o a bogus message as genuine. It also must be the case that the cost to the defender of accepting the message is non-trivial, and that the cost to the attacker is small enough in relation to its total resources that it nds the attack worth its e ort. This means, rst of all, that we need the capability of measuring cost to the attacker and cost to the defender.
There are a number of problems we must address when we model costs to attacker and defender. First of all, there is the problem of assigning and comparing costs of engaging in individual actions such as computing digital signatures, storing data, impersonating principals, etc. Di erent events may have costs that are not directly comparable. For example, the cost of computing a digital signature may not be directly comparable to the cost of storing a portion of a message for later reference, since they may use di erent resources. Moreover, what we may really be interested is not the raw cost in terms of memory or cycles used, but the ratio of cost to available resources. Finally, the actions available to an intruder may be di erent from those available to the defender; for example, the intruder, besides being able to perform the actions necessary to execute the protocol may also have the capability of impersonating principals, intercepting messages, and, in some instances, breaking cryptographic algorithms.
We may also need a way of computing the cost of several actions over time. When a principal participates in a protocol or accepts a message, it generally performs a sequence of actions instead of just one. What is the best way of computing the total cost of these actions when di erent actions may be using di erent resources?
Since we are merely developing a framework for possible models, not trying to develop any speci c model, so we do not need to solve this problem right away. However, we do not want to rule out any possible solutions, so we choose the most general structure that appears to be compatible with our needs. We will assume that there is a mapping from the set of possible protocol actions to a monoid with operator + which enjoys a partial order so that the sum of any two elements a and b dominates a and b. This monoid will be the set of possible costs, or cost set.
Once we have decided on a cost set and mapping, we need to decide over what sequence of operations we want to compute the cost. In order to do this, we will assume that there are two ways in which a defender could be caused to waste resources. One way would be by participating in a bogus instance of the protocol, up to the point at which an attack is detected. In this case, the cost of participating in the protocol for both attacker and defender must be the cost of engaging in the entire protocol up to the point at which the defender detects an error or the attacker stops participating. Another way would be in processing a bogus message inserted by the attacker into an ongoing protocol execution, which may or may not be legitimate. Assuming that the message contains an error, it could be replayed several times, until the defender times out. In this case the cost to the attacker is the cost of creating and inserting the message, while the cost to the defender is the cost of processing the bogus message up to the point at which it detects the error.
Once we have decided how to assign and compute costs, we still need to be able the characterize an attack on a protocol. This is not a trivial problem. There have been a number of di erent proposals for such characterizations. They generally fall into two camps: conservative models that require the intruder to have essentially no e ect on a successful protocol execution, and more exible models that allow the protocol analyst to set speci c security goals. It is clear that in our case we are interested in the most conservative model possible, since it is possible for an intruder to use any deviation as a hook for a denial of service attack, even if it does not lead to violation of a protocol goal such as secrecy or authentication of keys. As a matter of fact, it is possible for any deviation to be used as a hook for denial of service even if it does not lead to a successful protocol execution. For this reason we need a de nition of security that governs the behavior of protocols as they execute, not only after they terminate. Fortunately, such a model already exists: Gong and Syverson's fail-stop model 9].
Brie y, a protocol is fail-stop if any bogus message (that is, a replay or a message manufactured by the intruder) can be detected, and the protocol halts upon detection. Fail-stop protocols have some of the desirable features of a denial-of-service-resistant protocol. However, in order to achieve the fail-stop property, they must make use of strong authentication right from the beginning. This makes fail-stop protocols potentially vulnerable to denial of service attacks in which the target is forced to use up resources verifying bogus messages. Thus we need to modify our concept of fail-stop in order to make it applicable to our needs. However, we will do so in the manner we suggested earlier, by modifying our notion of an intruder's capability and introducing the notion of the cost to an intruder of its performing various activities.
We do this in two stages. First of all, we modify the notion of fail-stop by extending it to any action taken by a principal, not just the acceptance of a message. We can now de ne a function ? from actions in a protocol to costs. We can then say that a protocol is fail-stop with respect to ?, if a principal cannot be tricked into engaging in a protocol up to and including action A unless the attacker expends an e ort of more than ?(A). We are now in a state in which we can evaluate a protocol's resitance to denial of service. This proceeds roughly as follows (for the sake of clarity we omit some of the details).
We estimate the cost to the principal of engaging in all actions in a protocol up to and including A by adding their costs, and we compare this cost to ?(A). to the other, and a closer look may be necessary. The rest of this section will be organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we introduce the protocol that we will use as an illustrative example throughout this section: the Station-to-Station protocol of Di e, van Oorschot, and Wiener. In Section 2.3 we introduce our notation for specifying protocols such that each action is made explicit, and we show this notation can be used to describe the desired behavior of a protocol. In Section 2.4 we introduce the notion of cost and show how costs of protocol executions and are computed. In Section 2.5 we introduce an informal intruder model and show how costs of intruder actions are computed. In Section 2.6 we introduce the notion of a fail-stop protocol, and show how we modify it to meet our needs. In that section we also introduce the notion of tolerance relation, which can be used to model our estimate of the risk to a defender of being tricked into engaging in the protocol, and show how the tolerance relation and the modi ed fail-stop model can be used to analyze resistance to resource exhaustion attacks.
The Station to Station Protocol
The Station to Station protocol 4] is a protocol that was makes use of the Di e-Hellman protocol together with digital signatures in order to exchange and authenticate keys between two principals. It was designed with message e ciency rather than resistance to denial of service in mind, and thus makes an interesting case study for our analysis.
We assume that two principals share a common modulus P and a generator of the multiplicative group of GF(P). The protocol consists of three messages: A computes K = XB XA == XA XB . It uses that key to decrypt the message. It veri es that that the decrypted message contains B's signature on XB and XA . It then computes a similar signed and encrypted message and sends it to B. Since B also knows K, it can decrypt the message and verify the signature as well. As we can see, there are some obvious places where this protocol is open to resource exhaustion attacks. For example, when B receives the rst message from A, it starts to expend resources generating a Di e-Hellman key and computing signatures, even though it cannot yet be sure that the message came from A. As we shall see, our analysis will uncover some other vulnerabilities as well, along with some places where the protocol is not as open to denial of service attacks as might rst appear.
Alice-and-Bob Speci cations
In this section we introduce our notation for cryptographic protocols, which we will also use to specify correctness properties. We will be making use of the popular \Alice-and-Bob" speci cation style. This has been criticized as Since we are interested in producing a framework in which existing models can be integrated rather than a model itself, we will not attempt to introduce a syntax or semantics here, except to note that A and B are variables corresponding to names of communicating principals and M corresponds to a message sent between them.
Since we are interested in how messages are processed, as well as what messages are sent, we need to annotate our Alice-and-Bob speci cations to include message processing steps. Note that the M sent by A is not necessarily the N received by B. This is intentional, since we will assume that the message N may have been created by a hostile intruder, and so will not necessarily be the same as M. As a matter of fact, if may be possible for B to receive N from A without A every having sent any M to B at all.
Brie y, the events, in sequence, correspond to creating a message, sending a message, receiving a message, processing a message, and accepting a message. The motivation for the di erent types of events is as follows. A normal event represents the operations performed that can have only one outcome, success. After completing a normal event, a principal always moves on to the next event, if any. A veri cation event has two possible outcomes, success or failure. If the event succeed, the principal performing it moves onto the next event. If the event fails, the principal halts. An accept event describes a principal's deciding, after, successfully completing all the message process events, that the message is genuine and it is ready to move on to the next stage.
We do not prescribe any particular notation for events, but for the purposes of this paper we will denote them by atomic symbols. Events that describe the same operation (e.g. two digital signature veri cations) will be di erentiated by subscripts.
For example, consider the case in which A computes a digital signature over B's name and a nonce, and sends the result to B, together with its own name and B's. The We now show how this notation could be used to specify the Station-toStation protocol. Some of the obvious operations used are exponentiation (which we will denote by exp), digital signatures (sign), veri cation of digital signatures (checksig), encryption (encrypt) and decryption (decrypt). Some of the less obvious are storing information (storename, storenonce), looking up information (retrievenonce, checkname). We should also include the use of pre-calculated exponentiated values, which represent a di erent use of resources than exponentiation in real time.
Once we have determined the various possible events, the speci cation appears as follows: Although we do not attempt to give a formal semantics for Alice-and-Bob speci cations, we do need to be precise about the intended and actual order in which events occur. For this, we use the notion of a desirably-precedes relation, which is similar to the notion used in Gong and Syverson's fail-stop model, and like theirs, is based on Lamport's causally-precedes relation 12]. The only di erence between our notion and Lamport's is that Lamport was dealing with a situation in which, although messages could be delayed or lost, they were not spoofed, redirected, or altered by a hostile intruder. Thus, Lamport used the notion of causally-before to describe what actually happened in his environment, while we will merely use it to describe what we would like to happen in our environment.
For motivation, we rst give Lamport's de nition:
De nition 4 Let S be a system of distributed processes that communicate by sending messages. Let E be a temporally ordered sequence of events in S, where E consists of internal events, sending of messages, and receiving of messages. If a and b are two events from E, then b is causally-after a if: 1. a and b occur at the same process, and a precedes b; 2. a is the sending of a message by one process, and b is the receiving of the same message by another process, or;
3. there is an event c such that c is causally-after a and b is causally-after c. We say that E 1 is causally-after E 2 if E 2 causally-precedes E 1 .
We note that notions very similar to Lamport's have found fruitful application in the analysis of cryptographic protocols, most notably in the de nition of strand spaces 6]. However, for our purposes, we will need something a little di erent. An Alice-and-Bob speci cation of a cryptographic protocol can be thought of as giving of a requirements speci cation in terms of what events should causally-precede others. We thus de ne desirably-precedes (or desirablyafter), as follows: A sends M to B desirably-precedes the event in which B receives M from A, and; 5. If E 1 desirably-precedes E 2 and E 2 desirably-precedes E 3 then E 1 desirablyprecedes E 3 .
Note that that in the de nition of desirably-precedes, unlike our de nition of events, we do require that the message received by B in the receive event corresponding to A ! B : M be the same as the M sent by A. This is because
we are now describing what should happen when the protocol does proceed according to plan. An Alice-and-Bob speci cation can be used together with the desirablyprecedes relation to specify both the desired and actual behavior of a protocol. To understand how to do this, we need some notion of a semantics for such speci cations. In the interest of generality, we avoid giving a formal semantics, but we provide the following informal semantics. This will be not only be used to give us a better idea of how to apply annotated Alice-and-Bob speci cations, but we will also nd it helpful in the de nition of fail-stop protocols.
We begin by assuming that an annotated Alice-and-Bob speci cation corresponds to a set of programs, one for each principal variable described in the speci cation. Multiple copies of the programs may exist, corresponding to different instantiation of the principal variables, and these copies may be running concurrently. We may also assume that more than one copy may exist for the same instantiations of the principal variables, and these copies may also be running concurrently, allowing us to model the same principals taking part in multiple sessions. Each program corresponding to to a principal A can be broken down into a sequence of program fragments corresponding to the events engaged in by A. Program fragments corresponding to events engaged in by the same principal in the same copy of a program are assumed to execute in an order according to the desirably-precedes relation imposed by the speci cation, but no other assumption is made about the order of execution. In particular, there is no assumed ordering relation between the fragments corresponding to the sending and the receiving of a message.
We also assume that each program fragment has an output which can be either \success" or \failure". If the output is \success", the program proceeds to the next fragment. If the outcome is \failure", the program halts. Normal and accept events always output \success", while veri cation events can output \success" or \failure."
We model communication between programs as follows. 
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After accept 2 , it executes the actions sign 2 and encrypt 2 , and sends the message resulting from these actions to B.
Cost Sets and Protocol Cost Functions
Now that we have a notation for participation in a protocol, we can use it to compute the cost of participating in it. This is done by computing the cost of individual events, and summing up over the costs in an appropriate manner.
De nition 6 A cost set C is a monoid with monoid operation + with partial order < such x + y x and x + y x, for all x and y in C. Note in particular that x = x + 0 0 for all x.
Examples of cost could be things like time or money, in which case + is simple addition and the partial order is total. Or, it could be a vector corresponding to di erent limited resources, such as computation time, storage space, etc., in which case we might want the partial order to be a lattice. Or, it could be a rough estimate such as a division into \easy" or \hard," in which case x + y is simply the maximum of x and y. Or, it might represent the ratio of resources available to resources expended. Note that we do not even require that the + operation be commutative, so that the cost of expending resources x before resources y could be greater than expending y before x.
Next, we need to specify a mapping from protocol events to costs.
De nition 7 A function from the set of events de ned by an annotated Aliceand-Bob speci cation P to a cost set C which is 0 on the accept events is called an event cost function.
For our analysis of the Station-to-Station protocol we do not have a very precise notion of cost available. Thus, we will use the simplest possible cost set, consisting of four members: expensive > medium > cheap > 0. We assume that cryptographic operations involving exponentiation during the protocol (exp, checksig, sign) are expensive. All other cryptographic operations (encrypt, decrypt, preexp) are medium, and all other events are cheap.
We now de ne two functions based on event cost functions. One describes the cost of processing a single message in a protocol. The other describes the cost of a principal's reaching a given point in the protocol. These correspond to the two ways in which we assume that an attacker can cause a defender to waste resources; rst by processing a bogus instance of a message inserted by the attacker into a protocol run, and secondly by participating in a bogus instance of the protocol with the attacker.
De nition 8 Let P be an annotated Alice-and-Bob protocol, let C be a cost set, and let be an event cost function de ned on P and C. We de ne the message The message processing cost describes the cost of processing a message up to an including a failed veri cation event.
De nition 9 We de ne the protocol engagement cost function associated with to be the function de ned on accept events as follows: Note that the protocol engagement cost re ects not only the cost of all events up to and including the processing of the last message received, but the cost of composing any message sent as the result of sending that last message.
For the Station-to-Station protocol, we note that protocol engagement cost function is expensive for all accept events. For the rst, the responder B must compute the Di e-Hellman key and sign a message. For the second, the initiator A must check a signature, compute a Di e-Hellman key and sign a message. For the third, B must check a signature, as well as engage in all the previous events up to that point. For the message processing cost functions of the Station-to-Station protocol, none is de ned for the rst message, since it contains no veri cation events. For the second the cost of B's checking the name is cheap, while the cost of B's performing the signature is expensive. Likewise for the third message: the cost of A's checking a name is cheap, while the cost of its checking a signature is expensive.
Attackers and Attacker Cost Functions
Up to this point we have said very little about attackers. The attacker occupies the no-man's land between the messages sent and the messages received. Basically, we assume that when a principal receives a message, it may be a legitimate message as described by the Alice-and-Bob speci cation, or it may be a message concocted by the attacker. We do not attempt to give any kind of formal de nition of an attacker, except to note that the attacker, like the legitimate principals, concocts and sends its messages using a combination of events that have cost. Thus we need to specify a set of attacker events and attacker costs.
Most of the protocol veri cation literature depends upon a standard set of assumptions about the attacker's capabilities. In our case, however, we leave it up to the protocol analyst to specify what these capabilities are. All that we will require is that each possible intruder action be assigned a cost as follows.
We use the following intruder cost function to compute the amount of e ort that the intruder has to expend to interfere with a protocol.
De nition 10 We de ne an intruder action to be an event engaged in by an intruder that a ects messages received by legitimate participants in a protocol. We de ne an intruder capability to be a set of actions available to an intruder. Let C be a cost set. We de ne to be a function from the set of intruder actions to C. We extend to a function from an intruder capability to C by de ning (fx 1 ; :::; x n g) = (x 1 ) + ::: + (x n ). We call an intruder cost function.
Note that we do not require the cost set used for the attacker to be the cost set used for the defender. In order to make this distinction clear, we refer to the two cost sets as the attacker and defender cost sets.
For the Station-to-Station protocol, we will let the attacker cost set be the defender cost set augmented by two costs, very expensive and maximal, obeying the ordering implied by their names. Very expensive is used for actions that may be di cult to implement (such as man-in-the-middle attacks), but which may be worth it if the rewards are large enough. Maximal is reserved for events such as cryptanalysis which are in most cases assumed to be infeasible but should not be left out of the reckoning altogether.
We thus assume that the intruder capabilities and costs are as follows: 1. sending a legitimate message (Cost = the cost of computing the message); 2. forging a return address (Cost = cheap); 3. reading messages (Cost = medium); 4. creating a new message out of old ones (Cost = cost of deconstructing the old messages + cost of creating the new ones); 5. disabling of a legitimate principal (Cost = medium: this requires another denial-of-service attack, but since a disabled principal can be used more than once, the cost can be amortized over a number of attacks); 6. substituting bogus messages for genuine ones in real time, as would be done in a man-in-the-middle attack (Cost = very expensive);
7. breaking cryptosystems (Cost = maximal), and; 8. inducing a principal to initiate communication with a bogus, disabled, or dishonest principal (Cost = expensive to very expensive: it is not hard to induce a principal to do this a few times, but it is probably di cult to induce this the number of times required to launch a denial-of-service attack).
Fail-Stop Protocols
Now that we have a notion of protocol speci cations, attackers, defenders, and costs, we are able to show how we can modify Gong and Syverson's fail-stop model to specify desired levels of resistance to denial of service. We will begin by presenting the fail-stop model in terms of annotated Alice-and-Bob specications. We will show how it can be modi ed to re ect cost to attacker and defender, and how it can be used in the analyze a protocol's vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks.
A fail-stop protocol is one that provides a certain degree of security against attack. Thus, in order to de ne a fail-stop protocol, we need rst to say what an attack is. But an attack describes a behavior of the implemented protocol that deviates from its desired behavior. We have shown how an Alice-and-Bob speci cation can be used to described desired behavior. Now what we need is a way to describe deviations from that behavior.
Recall that we assumed that there exists some mapping of Alice-and-Bob speci cations to programs associated principals such that each event maps to a program fragment, and that fragments belonging to the same program execute in the order speci ed by the desirably-precedes order induced by the speci cation, while we make no assumptions about the order of execution of fragments corresponding to di erent programs. We use this idea for the following de nition.
De nition 11 We say that an event as occurred if the program fragment corresponding to it has executed. We say that M has been interfered with if either the event B receives M from A occurs but some event desirably-preceding it has not, or the event B receives M from A has already occurred.
Note that, as we have said previously, the fact that B receives M from A occurs does not mean the B actually received M or any other message from A. It simply means that B received a message at the point at which it was expecting the message M from A, and it is ready to perform a set of tests to determine whether the message was genuinely M and was sent by A. Thus although we use the term \interfered with" to be consistent with the language in 9], we note that it covers not only messages that were tampered with, but fake messages generated by an intruder.
We now give the de nition of fail-stop from 9], modi ed slightly to take into account our slightly di erent de nition of an event.
De nition 12 An Alice-and-Bob speci cation of a cryptographic protocol is fail-stop if, whenever a message is interfered with, then no accept event desirablyafter the receiving of that message will occur.
We now present our modi ed version of fail-stop. Since we need it to incorporate the notion of the e ort involved in interfering with messages, we use the following attack cost function to compute the amount of e ort that we want the intruder to have to expend to interfere with a protocol.
De nition 13 Let be a function from the set of events de ned by an annotated Alice-and-Bob speci cation P to a cost set C. We refer to as the attack cost function. We say that P is fail-stop with respect to if, for each event E in the system, if an intruder interferes with any message desirably-preceding E, then neither E nor any events desirably-after E will occur, unless the cost of the capabilities the intruder uses in interfering with the message or messages is at least (E).
If we assume the cost of exercising the usual Dolev-Yao set of intruder capabilities is some value M, and we let (E) > M whenever E is an accept event, and let it be zero for all other events, then the reader can verify that our de nition of fail-stop is equivalent to Gong and Syverson's.
The question we are left with, of course, is which a protocol analyst would want to use. Clearly, it should bear some relation to the defender cost functions. We make this idea more precise below.
De nition 14 Let C be a defender cost set, and let G be an attacker cost set. We de ne a tolerance relation to be the subset of C G consisting of all pairs (c,g) such that the protocol designer is willing to tolerate a situation in which an attacker cannot force a defender to expend resources of cost c or greater without revealing its identify or expending resources of cost g or greater. We say that In other words, the tolerance relation re ects the result of performing a risk analysis in which an estimate of the attacker's resources and its willingness to expend them is traded o against an estimate of the defender's available resources.
We can now describe the procedure for evaluating whether or not a protocol is secure against denial of service using the following steps:
1. Decide what you assume the various capabilities of the intruder can be, and what your intruder cost function is.
2. Decide what your tolerance relation is: how much are you willing to spend to provide a certain level of security, and how much insecurity are you willing to put up with given a certain amount of cost? 3. Determine the minimal attack cost functions with respect to which the protocol is fail-stop. 4. For each attack cost function de ned in Step 3, determine that: a) If E 1 is an event immediately preceding a veri cation event E 2 , in a line of a protocol, then ( 0 (E 2 ), (E 1 )) is within the tolerance relation.
This means, that, if M is the message received in the line in which E 1 and E 2 appear, the cost of getting to the point where E 2 succeeds or fails is 0 (E 2 ), and any intruder will have to expend cost (E 1 ) in order to successfully interfere with M after E 1 has nished executing. b) If E is an accept event, then ( (E), (E)) is within the tolerance relation.
Note that
Step 4a allows us to reason about the ability of a protocol to thwart an intruder who is only willing to expend a certain cost and who tries to mount a denial-of-service attack by causing a legitimate principal to waste resources processing a message before it has been able to verify that it could not have been forged by such an intruder.
Step 4b allows us to reason about the ability of a protocol to thwart an intruder who is only willing to expend a certain cost and who tried to mount a denial-of-service attack by causing a legitimate principal to waste resources participating in a protocol up to receiving a particular message and responding to it, before it has been able to verify that that message could not have been forged by such an intruder.
We show how this procedure would be applied to the Station-to-Station Protocol as follows.
We rst compute the attack cost functions and the protocol engagement cost functions for the accept events.
Clearly, since the rst message is not authenticated at all, it protects only against a very weak intruder, so at best we can take (accept 1 ) to be is the cost of creating and sending the message. This at rst appears to be medium, but in order to get this message accepted, the intruder does not have to include an exponentiated value. All it needs to do is substitute a eld taking up the appropriate amount of space, although it may have to take some care to be able to pass checks for obviously bogus values such as are recommended in 4]. Thus the cost is actually cheap. On the other hand, (accept 1 ) is expensive, since B is required to perform expensive exponentiation and computation of digital signatures as a result of accepting the message.
We can take (accept 3 ) to be maximal, in the sense that we have veri ed using the NRL Protocol Analyzer that an intruder expending less than maximal cost according to our model cannot break the protocol. (Note, however, that this is not the same as a full-scale proof that breaking the protocol is equivalent to breaking the underlying crypto-systems.)
What is surprising, however, is (accept 2 ). We would expect this to also be maximal, but as a matter of fact it is only very expensive, as it involves a man-in-the middle attack. As was shown by Lowe in 14], the event accept 2 is vulnerable against the following attack, where I is the intruder, and I Z is the intruder impersonating Z: We now compute the attack cost functions and the message processing cost functions for each veri cation event.
The rst veri cation event is checkname 1 . Since no veri cation is done before the name is checked, the associated is cheap. However, since no event except the reception of the message precedes checkname 1 at that line, and the cost of checkname 1 is itself cheap, the pair (c,g) computed should be well within any tolerance relation.
The next veri cation event is checksig 1 . The message processing cost 0 (checksig 1 ) is expensive. The event appearing immediately before checksig 1 is decrypt 1 . In order to spoof decrypt 1 , the intruder has at least to be able to induce A to initiate contact with a bogus, dishonest, or disabled B. The intruder can then construct a bogus message; for this the only capability required is the ability to read A's message, and possibly to fake B's return address. Thus (decrypt 1 ) is at least expensive to very expensive. This may or may not be within a protocol designer's tolerance relation.
The next veri cation event is checkname 2 . The event immediately preceding it is B's receipt of the third message in the protocol. Again, the mes- Finally, the last veri cation event is checksig 2 . Again, the message acceptance cost of checksig 2 is expensive. In this case, however, the attacker has two choices for tricking the B into applying checksig 2 to a bogus message. First of all, it could attempt to hijack an existing session between A and B in which A sent a legitimate rst message. The cost of this would be expensive, and thus the resulting pair (c,g) would be within most tolerance relations. The attacker's other option, however, would be to impersonate A from the beginning. Since no veri cation is made on A's rst message to B, this would only require the attacker to be able to spoof checkname 2 , and possibly to disable A prior to executing the protocol. Thus (decrypt 2 ) is at most medium, and the resulting (c,g) = (expensive, medium) is probably not within most tolerance relations.
Thus the Station-to-Station protocol, as it stands, is vulnerable to denial of service attacks in several places. In the rst message, an intruder who is capable of doing nothing more than sending messages could send a bogus message and cause the responder to waste resources responding to it. Likewise, since the only cheap interim checks leading up to the nal expensive check on the last message are weak, an intruder who is capable of faking return addresses and diverting messages could cause either the responder to waste resources in processing a bogus message. Finally, though less seriously since it is the most expensive of the attacks, an intruder could mount Lowe's attack and convince an initiator that it is sharing a key with a responder when it does not, and when the responder is not even expecting a message from the initiator.
There are a number of ways in which this protocol could be strengthened against denial of service attacks. First, a cookie exchange could be done initially, to introduce some weak authentication before the major message exchange starts, as is done in IKE 5], which uses a protocol based on the station-to-station protocol. Secondly, if cookies are included in second and third messages, checking them could provide weak authentication for these as well (as is also done by IKE). Weak authentication could also be provided by including both XA and XB in the second and third messages, so that either party Y could check for the presence of XY before proceeding with the more expensive veri cation steps. Finally, Lowe's attack could be prevented by including the identity of the intended receiver in the signed part of the message, as is recommended by Lowe in 14].
Applicability of Existing Tools and Models
In this section, we consider how some of the existing tools and methods could be applied within our framework.
We begin with belief logics. To look at them, we would not expect belief logics such as BAN 3] to be very useful within our framework. They use an implicit model of the intruder, and guarantee properties such as freshness and authentication, not immunity against intruders expending various amount of e ort. However, like our framework, BAN and similar logics are used to analyze protocols incrementally; one sees what degree of security is provided by each message as it is processed. And, although the properties guaranteed by these logics are currently cast in terms of beliefs in the properties of keys and messages, not properties of the intruder, there does not seem to be any inherent reason why they could not be recast as statements about what capabilities the intruder is supposed to have. For example, consider a message that contains a fresh subelement, such as a cookie. That message is authentic if we assume the the intruder is not able to read and modify messages in real time. On the other hand, a signed message containing a fresh sub-element is authenticated in the face of a stronger intruder.
We next consider tools that make use of state exploration techniques in some form or the other. These include model checkers such as FDR/Casper 15] or Mur 22] , specialized tools such as the Interrogator 20] that provide much of the same capability but are ne-tuned for cryptographic protocol analysis, and tools such as the NRL Protocol Analyzer 17] that combine state exploration with a limited theorem-proving capability. What all of these tools have in common is that at some point their designers implemented the standard intruder model as part of the tool. In 16], in which we modeled denial-of-service in terms of intruders of di erent strengths, we recommended replacing this implementation of the intruder model with implementations of a number of models representing intruders of di erent strengths, and to verify di erent goals of the protocol with respect to the appropriate model. However, with the cost-based framework described in this paper, it may make more sense to use a single intruder model, but to keep a running tally of the cost involved as an attack is constructed. Attacks that exceed the recommended costs would be ignored. A similar tally might also be appropriate for use in theorem-proving approaches such as 23] which also rely upon an explicit model of the intruder, although they do not compute attacks directly. Note that in some cases computing the cost could be a little tricky, especially in the case of such intruder actions as man-in-the-middle attacks which describe intruder behavior over several di erent states. However, this should still be easier than implementing a number of di erent intruder models.
The fact that we are modeling the security of a protocol in terms of an intruder of limited capacity also invites comparison with the vast amount of work that has been done using limited-capacity models in the cryptographic literature. In these models a protocol or algorithm is proven secure in face of an intruder who has limited computational capacity, for example, an intruder who is only able to solve polynomial-time problems. The main di erence between these models and ours is that these models generally only concern restrictions on the computational capacity of the intruder and use one set of assumptions to reason about a given protocol, while our framework includes restrictions on the capacity to perform various network operations and uses di erent sets of restrictions to reason about di erent points in a protocol's execution. However, a closer study of the ways in which assumptions about the computational capacity are used to reason about protocol security, particularly in work such as that of Bellare and Rogaway 1] and Lincoln et al., 13], which analyzes protocols similar to the ones we are considering in our work, would probably yield results that could be used to enhance our framework.
Finally, we consider the applicability of high-level protocol description languages, such as CAPSL 21] and Casper 15] . These languages are based on the popular Alice-and-Bob notation, so the most straightforward thing would appear to be to include the annotations that we have used in building our framework. But, as a matter of fact, this may not be necessary. Translators for these languages commonly infer the necessary operations directly from the speci cation; there is no reason that they should not also be able to derive a sequence of such operations that is optimal with respect to increasing cost, assuming that they are given the cost of each type of operation. Thus, all that would be needed to be added to the high-level speci cation would be an estimate of the cost of each type of operation; these could even be built into the translators when they are well understood. A protocol designer might also want to specify the desired attack cost function for various protocol subgoals; this could be built into the speci cation as an annotation.
Conclusion
We have developed a framework for reasoning about network denial of service, and indicated how existing tools and methods could be modi ed for reasoning within this framework. But there is still much work that remains to be done, in particular in the development of more realistic and sensitive cost functions. We used a rather crude and ad hoc cost function in our analysis of the Station to Station protocol, simply in order to illustrate how our framework could be applied. However, enough is known about the di culty of the various operations used in executing and attacking a cryptographic protocol that it should be possible to re ne it considerably. We expect that the main challenge will be in comparing the di culty of di erent sorts of operations, e.g. how do we compare the di culty of diverting a message with the di culty of computing a digital signature? This will probably be implementation-dependent and require careful analysis, breaking each action down into its component parts. Once this work is done, however, it should easily t into our framework.
There are several other issues that remain to be explored. One is the use of variable levels of defenses. In many cases, it is becoming the practice to use one level of veri cation when the environment is believed to be benign, and another more stringent, level of veri cation when a system is believed to be other attack. For example, in the benign case authentication checks may be made on only a portion of the system, while in the case that the system is under attack more rigorous authentication checks may be used. We can model this by using two di erent tolerance relation, one for the benign situation (in which we require security only against weak attackers), and one in the attack situation (in which we require security against strong attackers). It should then be possible to evaluate the two di erent authentication policies using the two di erent attack scenarios.
We have a nal comment to make about applying our framework to protocols that do not use strong authentication. In this paper we have mainly looked at protocols that use some form of strong authentication to achieve their goals, and the framework we present is derived from models used to reason about protocols that use strong authentication. However, authentication is a useful method for protection against denial of service attacks even for protocols for which it is not practical against cryptography. For example, one of the most common form of attack is simply to ood a channel with messages. This is can actually be seen as a denial of service attack on the router, and thus could be defended against, at least in part, by requiring the router to perform lightweight authentication. But even the simplest checks can have a nontrivial cost to a router. Thus it is conceivable that a framework like ours could be useful in analyzing the e ect of using di erent types of authentication on even low-level protocols that use light-weight authentication measures. We plan to investigate these issues in our further work.
